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Abstract
The New South Wales (NSW) government created the Sydney Metro Authority to design,
build and operate a completely separate underground Metro rail system to supplement the
existing public transport network in Sydney. By the time the NSW government abruptly
cancelled the entire Metro project in early 2010, the Authority had conceived and designed a
contract that was proceeding to procurement. This paper examines the nature of the
proposed Sydney Metro contract in relation to its performance framework and compares this
to the frameworks in current contracts for bus, rail and ferry public transport in NSW. Against
this background, the paper examines the extent to which the Sydney Metro approach has
had an impact on subsequent public transport contracts in the context of the literature on
optimal contracting and optimal incentives. The paper concludes that little has been
implemented, although the other mode contracts now enable more performance
measurement and incentivisation. In particular, the decision to award contracts to existing
(and mostly public sector) operators appears to have acted as a brake on developing these
performance elements.

1. Introduction
In November 2008, the New South Wales (NSW) government created the Sydney Metro
Authority, a new agency tasked with designing, building and operating a completely separate
underground Metro rail system to supplement the existing public transport network in Sydney.
The Metro program was progressing to contract negotiations when the NSW government
abruptly cancelled the entire Metro project in February 2010.
This paper is concerned with the performance framework embedded (or otherwise) in
contracts between government and transport operators for the provision of public transport
services. The first strand of this paper is a comparison between the contracts for other
modes operating in the NSW metropolitan area of Sydney to identify the degree of
commonality between the contracts for existing modes in Sydney and the new mode of
underground metro. A second strand looks at the influence of the Sydney Metro Authority’s
contract development and considers the implications for future modal contracts in NSW.
A parliamentary information request and the public archiving of the Sydney Metro Authority’s
records following its dis-establishment has put the approach to the proposed Metro contract
in the public domain. The generic bus contracts for metropolitan bus services have long been
in the public domain. The rail and ferry contracts are not currently publicly available (they are
expected to become available shortly under the Government Information (Public Access) Act
2009), although some information is available from other sources.
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The next section considers the literature relating to optimal contracts and optimal incentives
as underpinning the contractual relationship between operators and government in NSW.
The paper considers the nature of the performance elements of existing modal contracts for
bus, rail and ferry services in Section 3 and this is followed in Section 4 by an outline of the
performance framework proposed for the Sydney Metro. This paper recognises that the bus,
ferry and rail contracts are implemented whereas the Metro has not and may not have been
implemented in the way portrayed in this paper if the Sydney Metro project had come to
fruition. The discussion in section 5 relates issues identified by the optimal contract literature
to the existing contracts in NSW.

2. Optimal contracting and optimal incentives
Worldwide, there is an increasing use of the “public-private partnership” (PPP) to deliver
transport and other services. A PPP can be defined as a “contractual agreement between a
public agency (federal, state or local) and a private sector entity. In addition to the sharing of
resources, each party shares in the risks and rewards potential in the delivery of the service
and/or facility” (NCPPP 2011). A broader definition refers to “working arrangements based on
a mutual commitment (over and above that implied in any contract) between a public sector
organisation with any organisation outside of the public sector” (Boivard 2004, p. 199).
When public and private entities ‘blend’ to work together to achieve a particular goal, the
issue of governance immediately arises. Within private corporations, “corporate governance
deals with the ways in which suppliers of finance to corporations assure themselves of
getting a return on their investment” (Shliefer and Vishny 1997, p. 737). Within public entities,
the issues are a bit more complex; good governance in that context aims to deliver goods
and services cost-effectively and efficiently to constituents while ensuring adequate
democratic process and citizen voice (Koppell 2003).
Much of the large literature on private corporate governance focuses on the agency problem
and the related theory of transactions costs to discuss why the firm exists and what
governance institutions are best suited to ensuring its efficient operation (Coase 1937; Fama
1980; Williamson 1988). There is an equally large literature on governance within the public
sector, where the themes of ‘networked’ and ‘distributed’ oversight and accountability are
emerging (Bovens et al. 2001).
The main justification for PPPs is that they create a synergy value that public ownership
alone is unable to tap into. This synergy value is created whenever a combination of parties
– involving government along with private operators, and/or non-profit organisations –
combine to create financial or operational capabilities greater than any one party can provide
alone (Weihe 2008).
But as noted above, there is an ‘agency’ problem: private and public parties do not typically
have aligned interests (in economic terms, public and private ‘objective functions’ will
generally differ from one another) and a governance structure must be designed to ensure
both proper alignment and successful achievement of mutually desired outcomes.
Contracting is the primary way this agency problem can be resolved, if it is designed
properly. A primary public objective of any contract is (or should be) ‘Value for Money’ (VfM),
while a primary private objective is profit maximisation. How can a contract be designed to
ensure such alignment and then successful achievement of contract goals? The ‘optimal
contracting’ literature suggests three key questions:
1. Who are the relevant parties to the contract?
2. How can their interests and objectives be aligned in the contract?
3. How will the contract, once signed, be overseen and monitored to ensure optimal
performance?
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With respect to (1), Hensher and Houghton (2005) break down this question by categorising
the different roles played by parties to the contract: government plays a strategic role; the
regulator plays a tactical role; and the operator plays an operational role. These are generic
categories and in reality may be combined in some cases (e.g., a single entity may contain
both the government and regulator role). A very useful aspect of this schema is that it
abstracts away from ‘public’ and ‘private’ to focus on roles that must be accomplished in any
PPP. Specification of these roles and assignment of responsibilities for them are an important
starting point to any contract and should be considered explicitly by all contracting parties.
The answer to (2) involves a number of dimensions which revolve around appropriate
incentives. This paper focuses on two explicit incentive elements: performance payments
and penalties (i.e. reward) and risk allocation. But implicit performance incentive structures
are also relevant and include tender design, contracting process, contract term and
institutional form; these will also be discussed below.
A key finding of the literature is that incentive payments and bonuses (or their inverse,
penalties and abatements) are generally especially effective (and better than fixed payment
schemes) in ensuring good performance in terms of outcomes (Hensher and Houghton 2005;
Bloomfield 2006). Outcomes, such as improved access, mobility and service, are what any
contract should aim for. Inputs such as increased spending or outputs such as more trains
and buses, by themselves, are not desirable. Obviously the details of incentives must be
carefully worked out and if poorly designed can lead to substandard outcomes.
The specific metrics chosen to award incentives and/or penalties are crucial. Examples of
perverse incentives and unintended consequences arising from badly designed metrics in
contracts are rife (Behn and Kant 1999; Skelcher 2005; Bloomfield 2006). Even if a metric is
conceptually sound, there must be a robust process for measuring whether targets are being
met and an adequate system for reporting results in a timely manner and to the parties most
interested in optimal performance. In many if not most cases, this should include the users of
a facility or service and possibly the general public who directly or indirectly are financing the
contract itself.
The other side of performance is risk. There are a variety of risk types (revenue, cost, etc.).
Just as interests of the various parties to the contract should be properly aligned, so should
risk allocation. As an example, political risk should generally be borne by government, the
party best able to bear it and most influential over its magnitude and incidence. Revenue risk
can be more complicated. Uncertainty is part of any contract and it should not always be
assumed that the operator should bear it in its various manifestations completely. It is
important that each party should bear the amount and type of risk it is most efficient at
dealing with and that risk-bearing should not create countervailing incentives to those
contained in performance payments. A simple example of this is a contract which might have
strong operator performance incentives explicitly but in which the government bears all the
revenue and cost risk (Quiggin 2005; Ng and Loosemore 2007).
Implicit incentives and risk allocation can work against the explicit contract risk and reward
provisions if not designed properly. Contract duration is extremely important. Long contracts
might transfer effective control of an asset or service to a particular party even though
nominal control or ownership might rest with a different party in the actual contract document.
Long contracts might also reduce incentives for the operator to perform because they provide
too much security of tenure. Some of this may be ameliorated, however, by having provisions
subject to review and revision at specified periods (Ortiz et al. 2007; Kwak et al. 2009).
Identifying an ideal set of potential operators and then selecting the best one or several out
of that set is equally critical. This comes down to the tendering process used, in particular
whether bids are solicited and selected on a competitive or negotiated basis. The general
evidence is that competitive tendering yields better contracting outcomes than noncompetitive (negotiated) ones, though there are exceptions to this general rule (Hensher and
Stanley 2003).
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More generally, institutional arrangements are extremely important. With transport
privatisation in particular, there is a difference between an actual gain in resources and a
mere transfer of resources from one account to another. Some research on transport
privatisation indicates that what are often seen as efficiency gains are really budgetary gains
to the public authority that are achieved through losses incurred by other groups (GomezIbanez and Meyer 1993).
So a question arises: is a government institution (‘public’) naturally better at some activities
while private institutions are naturally better at others? Is a particular private-public blend
best for a particular set of circumstances and what might those circumstances be? There is
no simple answer to this question and it is not a major focus of the analysis here but is
nonetheless important, especially when new institutions are being designed to carry out a
particular contract or venture.
This discussion shades into key question (3), namely ensuring that the terms of the contract
are satisfactorily carried out as originally intended by all parties concerned. Even a welldesigned contract can be a failure if not properly implemented. Managing contracts, and in
particular measuring, monitoring and reporting of performance incentives and payments, is a
difficult issue in practice. Private sector investors need to ask questions about how cash
flows and income are measured. On the public sector side, there is an additional issue about
defining the public good and determining whether maximisation of shareholder value is
consistent with maximum user value and value for the overall public. Maintenance of the
public interest is a prime concern with any PPP. For any given project, the government must
have a clear picture of its public objectives, and must devise contracts that ensure that these
objectives will be achieved (Hodge 2004).
In general all contracting parties will want, generically, project success. This success consists
specifically of an assurance that projects will be effectively designed with resulting services
that will be efficiently implemented to provide a reasonable benefit or return to all intended
parties. Initial performance measurement along all of these dimensions can help to ensure
appropriate alignment of public and private benefits, and equity as well as efficiency in
financing and pricing. It can also provide a basis for ongoing monitoring, which can
potentially help to reduce or avoid shortfalls in any of the performance dimensions, as well as
misalignment of performance among these various dimensions.

3. Existing public transport contracts for metropolitan Sydney
This section considers the contracts for the public transport modes of bus, ferry and rail
which form the network of public transport services in Sydney. Table 3, located in Section 5,
summarises elements of these contracts. Two other modes of public transport, light rail and
monorail, are excluded from further consideration because the contents of the contract are
not in the public domain and because of the very minor role they play in the public transport
network. The light rail is privately run following complicated contractual arrangements
completed in 1994 as a BOOT (Build, own, operate for a period of time before transferring
the asset to government) (Mills 1997), and the same operator now operates the monorail.

3.1 Bus services
3.1.1 Background
Prior to 2003, the NSW government had contracts with 87 individual bus operators in
Sydney. The government set the required service levels, frequency of service and hours of
operation for regular bus services. The operator retained all farebox revenue and, in addition,
received a payment from the government for student travel and concessionary travel. In 2003
the government commissioned a Ministerial Review of Bus services (Unsworth 2004). The
terms of reference for the review included performance-related objectives including “funding,
contractual and regulatory arrangements and any legislative changes required to implement
these improvements” (Unsworth 2004, p. 93).
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In addition to recommending changes to the metropolitan bus contracting areas and revised
responsibilities for network planning, the review called for a new contracting regime for new,
larger metropolitan contract areas. Contracts were recommended to include substantial
performance elements and should be won by competitive tendering on cost plus other
factors: “service planning skills; on-time running/reliability; environmental history; customer
relations activities; and workplace relations, OH&S experience and proposed approach”
(Unsworth 2004, p. 33). The review proposed that contracts should include standards for
service quality, including “punctuality and reliability, timetable information, signage, customer
relations/complaint handling, fleet specifications, and environmental performance” (Unsworth
2004, p. 34). It was noted that the implementation of the recommendations of the review
would involve changes to the Passenger Transport Act 1990, as the Act did not give sufficient
provision for “performance standards and penalties” (Unsworth 2004, p. 91).
Following the final report, the government accepted many of the recommendations and
embarked on a Bus Reform program in 2004. Following enabling legislation amendments in
2004 and 2005, the 87 contracts with individual operators were rationalised to one contract
for each of the 15 metropolitan and 10 outer metropolitan contract areas. Where a contract
area had more than one operator, the contract was made between the government and a
Management Board representing the relevant operators.
3.1.2 Generic 2005 bus contract
The metropolitan and outer metropolitan contracts cover the provision of bus services in
each contract area for a period of seven years. The current template (often referred to as the
‘generic’ contract) for the metropolitan contract has two performance related payment
mechanisms: the Operational Performance Regime (OPR) and the Service Quality Incentive
(SQI). Neither of these mechanisms has been put into effect. Whilst the contracts for the
metropolitan and outer metropolitan areas vary in some detail, they are identical in relation to
the performance related mechanisms (NSW Ministry of Transport 2005a, 2005b, 2005c,
2005d).
The contract sets out the principles of the OPR and the rules for its formulation, calibration
and implementation. The OPR measures reliability and punctuality of services through
reviewing disruption to timetabled services. In addition the contract refers to, but does not
specify, a cap on bonus and penalty payments. Any disruptions caused by ‘abnormal events’
(force majeure and other events beyond the control of the operator) are excluded from the
measurement process.
The contract states that the Director General may award a SQI payment and sets out the
measurement framework for the SQI. It contains six performance indicators with
corresponding weights, listed in Table 1. The contract does not set out the details of how
these components will be measured or any information on the likely scale of the payment.
Patronage growth is incentivised through a Patronage Change Payment which compares
current year patronage, scaled by type and length of journey, with the previous year. The
payment operates as a bonus/abatement regime: in cases where there is a decrease in
calculated patronage the operator pays a penalty, although these bonuses/penalties can be
accumulated over the years (NSW Ministry of Transport 2005b).
The contract also specifies four Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) which are proposed in
the future to assess performance against compliance standards (NSW MoT 2005b). Failure
to meet these standards would be taken into account in assessments associated with
contract renewal (NSW MoT 2005a). The KPIs (and associated standards) are complaints
management (falling numbers and response times), environmental protection (100% drivers
trained), safety (100% drivers trained) and efficiency/productivity (5-10% improvement in
revenue km per driver and total costs per revenue km).
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Table 1 Metropolitan bus contracts: components of the Service Quality Incentive
Aspect of service quality

Measure(s)

Customer satisfaction

Staff helpfulness and courtesy
Vehicle cleanliness
Provision of Information
Personal Security
Service provision (where services go and when)
Ticket machine availability and performance
Overcrowding
Volume of complaints
Response time
Assessment by DoT through interviews with
stakeholders and operator

50%

Periodic reviews by DoT to measure capacity,
especially at peak loading points
Periodic reviews by DoT of vehicle cleanliness and
compliance
Periodic reviews by DoT of performance against plan

5%

Complaints
Co-operation with Other
Operators and the
Community
Load standards
Vehicle presentation
Environmental performance

Weight

20%
15%

5%
5%

Source: summarised from NSW Ministry of Transport (2005b) p.17-18.

3.1.3 Status
Progress on bus contracting was examined in a report by the Auditor-General NSW (2010c).
The audit report notes that although the contracts were introduced as planned in 2005 (albeit
on the basis of direct negotiation rather than competitive tendering), progress with
incorporating performance elements had been slow. At the time of the report in March 2010,
the government agency was in a position to monitor aspects of performance and quality but
had not negotiated the structure of bonuses and penalties that would be used in relation to
these measures. Although existing contracts enable operators to be penalised for poor
performance, no penalties had been applied over the first four years of the contracts.
The audit report lists the six performance measures that were introduced and implemented in
2009, following a period of consultation which began in 2005: “cost per service kilometre;
number of complaints; overall satisfaction from customer survey; service reliability; vehicle
condition; and passenger boardings per service kilometre” (Auditor-General NSW 2010c, p.
16). Eleven further indicators “important to bus operations and to bus users” (Auditor-General
NSW 2010c, p. 15) are proposed by the Auditor-General, without which “it is not possible to
assess the efficiency and effectiveness of metropolitan bus services and it is much more
difficult to identify specific performance improvements and performance failures” (AuditorGeneral NSW 2010c, p. 16).

3.2 Ferry services
3.2.1 Background
Most ferry services in Sydney are provided by the state-owned Sydney Ferries Corporation.
In 2007, the government commissioned an inquiry into Sydney Ferries (Walker 2007). The
acknowledged dominant purpose of the inquiry was “to report on action which should be
taken to improve the ability of the Sydney Ferries Corporation (SFC) to provide safe, efficient
and customer-focussed ferry services” (Walker 2007, p. 3). The impact of the lack of a
contract was highlighted: “Sydney Ferries Corporation does not have a contract with
Government which sets out the terms by which it should operate. With or without a contract,
as a State Owned Corporation, SFC cannot be subject to any meaningful penalties for non
performance or poor performance nor are there any real financial incentives to perform well”
(Walker 2007, p. 1). The report looked at the relationship between SFC governance and
performance, but cited difficulties with assessing performance, stemming from a lack of a
performance management framework (Walker 2007, p. 150) and a workplace culture that
6
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“significantly inhibits the capacity of the organization to achieve efficiency and service
delivery improvements” (Walker 2007, p. 160).
With regards to contracting, the Walker report compared various potential approaches to
promoting efficiency and quality through a contract with private operators, a state-owned
corporation (SOC), or a public-private partnership. The report recommended that “the
Government undertake to pay a price fixed by a service contract to a private-enterprise
corporation for the provision of ferry services pursuant to a service contract as required by
the Passenger Transport Act 1990 but on a provisional basis, that is, until it proves to be no
more expensive than a SOC providing ferry services pursuant to a service contract as
required by the Passenger Transport Act 1990 (Walker 2007, p. 334).
The report also lists legislative changes that would be required to enable effective
contracting, including provisions to enable the regulator to offer or enforce incentives
designed to ensure service standards (Walker 2007, p. 125-126). The report does not specify
the types of standards or levels to be applied to these standards that should be included in a
performance related regime.
3.2.2 Sydney Ferries contract
Following the Walker report, a market review was commenced in 2008, including a request
for tender. Benchmarking the results of this exercise with SFC performance data led to a
decision to sign a seven-year operating contract to SFC in April 2010 (Auditor General NSW
2010a). The contract is not currently publicly available, but the Auditor-General’s report refers
to details of the seven year contract (Auditor-General NSW 2010b): “The new service
contract provides clear performance benchmarks for Sydney Ferries. Under the contract
Sydney Ferries must continue its reform program, which includes cost reductions through
restructuring, productivity gains through better work practices and improvements to safety
and customer service”. The report presents performance information and targets for 15
financial and non-financial KPIs (Table 2), but it is not known which, if any, of these KPIs form
part of the service standards or part of the contractual incentive regimes (Auditor-General
NSW 2010b).
Table 2 Ferry contract: potential performance indicators
Operational performance

Financial performance

Services that run on time (%)
Patronage growth (%)
Number of customer complaints
Number of significant incidents
Number of passenger injuries
Number of sick days taken per employee
Fleet availability (%)
Vessel reliability (%)
Number of passenger journeys (million)
Patronage growth (%)
Number of fleet failures

Earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and
amortisation
Operating deficit
Return on average assets (%)
Return on average equity (%)

Source: Auditor-General NSW (2010b).

3.3 Rail services
Rail services in Sydney are provided by RailCorp through the brand name CityRail for
metropolitan services. There was a Rail Performance Agreement for the period 1 July 2006
to 30 June 2011 between the Minister for Transport and RailCorp, but a new service contract
replaced the agreement in 2010. The rail services contract required under the Passenger
Transport Act 1990 is not currently publicly available but is expected to be made available
7
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under Government Information (Public Access) Act. However, the RailCorp Customer Charter
(RailCorp 2011) contains 25 commitments in eight key areas: on-time trains; manage
crowding; fast, accurate and useful information; safe and secure travel; clean trains and
stations; fast ticket sales; quick and fair complaints handling; and accessible services and
facilities. RailCorp provides a quarterly update on commitments on its website, although
there is no publicly reported connection between the Customer Charter and the performance
element of the rail services contract. The Independent Transport Safety and Reliability
Regulator (ITSRR) (2010) reported on performance and noted a relationship between the rail
performance agreement and the Customer Charter.
A very public element of RailCorp’s performance has been on-time running, and its definition.
The commitments are: to run more than 92% of trains on time on all lines, even at the busiest
times, with less than 0.5% cancelled, and to stop at all scheduled stops at least 99.5% of the
time. In July 2005, the on-time running benchmark for suburban services changed from three
minutes and 59 seconds to five minutes. RailCorp publishes its on-time running performance
daily on its website, as well as weekly, monthly and yearly data. As far as is known, RailCorp
does not incur penalties or receive bonus payments related to its on-time running.
Under the auspices of ITSRR, Mejia and Lind (2009) conducted a review of best practice in
rail contracting, presumably with the intention of setting some standards for the (then)
forthcoming contract for the operation of the CityRail network. The review sets out the
necessary elements of a commuter services contract including a statement of scope,
objectives and contract term; clarity of roles and responsibilities; service levels, quality
standards and requirements for integration; and mechanisms for funding, monitoring,
reporting, incentivisation, dispute resolution and contract variation. Bonus and penalty
regimes are cited by Mejia and Lind (2009) as a way to encourage contract compliance.
However, they question the effectiveness of these in public sector contracting where the
profit motive is not a strong driver. Their research also found that a collaborative relationship
between purchaser and operator is an important facet of successful contracting.

4. The Sydney Metro contract
4.1 Background
The Urban Transport Statement (NSW Government 2006) introduced the concept of metro
rail to link high demand corridors to major centres in Sydney and this initiated the process for
investigating the viability and setting the agenda for metro development in Sydney. On 18
March 2008 the North West Metro was announced as the initial link in a metro network for
Sydney but this was deferred in an announcement in November 2008 with a CBD Metro
being then proposed as a first part of a staged approach to the metro network (Transport
NSW 2010a).
A shadow operator was appointed early in the process through a process of open tendering
to imitate the role of an actual operator and to provide the business plan and strategy
underpinning the development of a contract for actual provision of the proposed link
(Transport NSW 2010a).
The Sydney Metro contract information, as developed by the Sydney Metro Authority, is
publicly available (http://www.transport.nsw.gov.au/sites/default/file/metrodocs/). All contract
information described below comes from Schedule 3 of the proposed project deed (Transport
NSW 2010b) unless otherwise referenced. The Sydney Metro contract was designed for a
35-year building and operating period by a successful PPP bidder (Transport NSW 2010c).
The form of the contract was ‘Design, Build, Operate, and Maintain’ (DBOM). The successful
bidder would have had responsibility for building the metro system (after the tunnels and
station cavities had been constructed through a separate contract), sourcing and maintaining
rollingstock and operational systems, operating the metro according to the specifications set
out in the contract, and handing back the assets to the government at the end of the contract
period.
8

Australasian Transport Research Forum 2011 Proceedings
28 - 30 September 2011, Adelaide, Australia
Publication website: http://www.patrec.org/atrf.aspx

4.2 The performance framework
Consistent with the theory underlying PPPs and performance contract incentives, the
government department as contract holder would have controlled the quality of the metro and
its services through a performance related payment mechanism. Parameters in the
mechanism, in particular the bottom line operating fee, were to be proposed by competing
bidders. In the bids, these fees were to be accompanied by design, construction and
operating plans in sufficient detail to enable the government department to assess the long
term viability of the bidding consortia (Transport NSW 2010c).
The Metro project was abandoned by government during the tendering phase. The following
description is of a contract which did not come into effect. The payment regime for the
operating period consisted of an availability payment to which modifications would be made
in relation to operational performance. The main components of the formula were:
Service Payment = Availability Fee – Service Critical Abatement
+/- Patronage Payment + Service Quality Payment
+ Asset Management Payment.
4.2.1 Service critical abatement
The service critical abatement (SCA) would have penalised the operating company in cases
where it failed to operate the Metro according to the specified availability and reliability
standards. These standards were set out as a timetable, which was in the form of ‘trains per
hour’ across different daily operating periods. The contract also sets out a process for the
number of trains per hour to be amended at the behest of the NSW government. In order to
ensure a regular and effective service within the current timetable, the SCA was composed of
three measures: service delivery, service reliability and journey time.
Service delivery was measured by the amount of trains run in each of six weekday and three
weekend operating periods. Payment would be abated for each operating period in which the
operating company failed to run the specified number of trains. For example, the evening
period lasted four hours, and 12 trains per hour were specified in each direction. In principal
abatement would occur if the operating company ran less than 96 trains over the four hour
period. In practice a small amount of tolerance was built into the contract.
Service reliability was designed to ensure an even supply of metro services across time. It
was measured by ‘missed headways’. The timetable specification of trains per hour implied
an average headway for each operating period. In the example of 12 trains per hour, this
average headway would be five minutes: the service critical abatement would be applied on
occasions when any headway was above five minutes plus a tolerance of 45 seconds.
The third element of the SCA measured passenger journey times. The first two measures
would have helped to ensure a consistent service for passengers. However, they provided no
incentive for the operating company to run trains at a reasonable speed. In fact, since fuel
costs increase with greater train acceleration and operating speeds, the operating company
might have had an incentive to run the trains as slowly as possible. Hence this third
measure, which aggregated all journey times between combinations of arrival and
destination points, and compared this with benchmarked aggregated times. Abatement would
be imposed if the discrepancy was above a tolerance.
The SCA was to be calculated daily, and its calibration was not linear. Any day with more
than 99.4% performance, based on a weighted average of the components, would attract
zero abatement. The marginal level of abatement was greater at high performance levels
(85% up to 99.4%) than at lower performance levels. The contract also specified a point
below which consistently poor performance would be deemed unacceptable and would
constitute a default of contract (Transport NSW 2010c). The SCA calculation also made
provision for various special cases. For example, additional abatement would be caused by a
service interruption (defined as any station receiving no metro service in one or both
9
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directions in any 15 minute period), and during periods of planned maintenance the level of
abatement would be reduced.
4.2.2 Patronage payment
The patronage payment (PP), labelled ‘Customer Acceptance and Integration Payment’ in
the contract documentation, encouraged the operating company to ensure that design and
operation of the metro was geared towards patronage growth. The payment was assessed
by measuring actual patronage against a benchmark, which was recalibrated every three
years. The PP had a maximum upside for the operating company of $2m per annum which,
as the annual cost for stage 1 of the metro was estimated at $50m (Transport NSW 2010d),
represents a maximum upside of 4% of the contract cost. This element of the payment
regime was to be the subject of discussion and refinement during the tendering process, and
reviewed after 10 years of metro operation (see Ortiz et al. 2007; Kwak et al. 2009).
4.2.3 Service quality payment
The service quality payment (SQP) was a sum to be added to the availability payment, to a
maximum of $5m per annum which, as the annual cost for stage 1 of the metro was
estimated at $50m (Transport NSW, 2011d), represents a maximum upside of 10% of the
contract cost. The actual payment was determined through a weighted average of scores on
twelve service quality KPIs, summarised in Table 3.
Table 3 Components of the Sydney Metro Service Quality Payment
Service Quality Measure

Measurement method

Weight

Passenger safety

Passenger survey

20%

Ride quality

Passenger survey

10%

Provision of information during service disruptions

Passenger survey

10%

Availability of customer assistance

Mystery shopper

10%

Ease of purchasing a ticket

Passenger survey

8%

Cleanliness of stations

Inspection by third party

8%

Cleanliness of trains

Inspection by third party

8%

Evidence of graffiti and vandalism

Inspection by third party

8%

Temperatures in stations and trains

Operational systems

8%

Availability of escalators

Operational systems

4%

Availability of CCTV

Operational systems

4%

Availability of lifts

Operational systems

2%

Source: Transport NSW (2010b) p 30

Each measure in the SQP was calibrated so that marginal payments were greater at higher
performance levels. For example Figure 1, taken from the Metro contract documentation,
shows the profile for scores in the customer survey on ‘ease of ticket purchase’. The
measure was the proportion of respondents who replied ‘easy’ or ‘very easy’ in a five-point
scale to the question ‘how easy was it to purchase your ticket?’ If this proportion was less
than 50% then the KPI would not qualify for payment. A score between 50% and 70% could
attract up to 20% of the maximum possible payment, and a score over 70% up to 95% would
earn greater marginal payment for each percentage point improvement.
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Figure 1 Example scoring profile for Sydney Metro service quality

Source: Transport NSW (2010b) p. 37.

Payments were to be made quarterly; in cases where sampling volatility was expected the
measurement was converted to a moving annual average. The contract documentation
includes a large amount of detail on measurement methods and governance of the
measurement processes, probably for the purpose of transparency. The contract also sets
out rules for consistently unacceptable service quality performance, which would lead to a
default (Transport NSW 2010c).
4.2.4 Asset management payment
The final component of the service payment related to the maintenance of the metro assets.
The operating company was to be responsible for maintaining these assets to an expected
condition. The government would assess asset condition through an inspection regime, and
withhold a proportion of the service payment if the condition of any assets was not as
expected with respect to their asset life cycle. The withheld payment would be paid when the
faults had been rectified.
4.2.5 Other payment mechanism provisions
In addition to performance-related payments, the final service payment was subject to two
further amendments. Firstly, a ‘Reporting Failure Amount’ was specified to penalise the
operating company if it failed to provide auditable information in relation to any of the
specified performance measures. Measurement of all of the service critical KPIs and four of
the service quality KPIs depended on the operating company’s systems. Secondly, the
bidding process allowed the operating company to opt for either a fixed or floating rate for
calculation of the service payment, since the payment was in part repayment for the initial
design and construction phases.

5. Discussion
5.1 A comparison of the different contracts
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Table 4 provides a comparison of the different elements of the contracts identified in the
different sections above. The four modal contracts (three implemented and one proposed)
were designed to meet differing circumstances. In particular, the operating environments of
the four modes had markedly different histories and this naturally will have affected the
approach to contracting. The Sydney Metro project had no antecedent organisational issues
to be taken into account: it was effectively a ‘greenfield’ project. The appointment of the
shadow operator and the creation of an almost ‘arms length’ separate Authority suggests that
there was an intention to start anew in the development of a contract and operating
environment. In contrast, contracts for the three existing modes were subject to prior
government or independent inquiries before implementation: the Unsworth review for buses
and the Walker review for ferries. Although no formal review has been found for rail, rail
operations and performance had been subject to annual reviews by the Independent Pricing
and Regulatory Tribunal in fare determinations and ITSRR.
Table 4 shows some key differences between the contracts. Only buses were not in a
monopoly operation situation. Whilst the contract length for the Sydney Metro was proposed
as 35 years, those for existing modes have been much shorter at 7 years. The nature of the
contracts is different too with the metro contract being a DBOM and the others resembling
operating only contracts: this will undoubtedly have had an impact on contract design. The
stark difference highlighted by this table is the clear specification of the Metro contract
elements in contrast to the contracts for the other modes. Table 3 also highlights similarities
and shows that there are greater similarities between the contracts for rail and ferry, as stateowned assets as compared to the mixed ownership structure observed in the bus industry
and the private ownership proposed for Metro.

5.2 Performance frameworks and relationship to optimal contracts
A theme of this paper is the degree of integration of transport contracting across the four
modes within NSW in their approach to performance specification and incentives. If this is
the case, then some evidence of sequence would be expected: the more recent contracts
were developed in the knowledge of what had gone before and therefore would contain
some evidence of learning from the earlier ones. The sequence for the four contracts
considered here is: bus (2005); metro (2009); ferry (2010); and rail (2010). The evidence of
section 3 and section 4 suggests that there are significant differences between the existing
mode contracts and the proposed contract for metro. These are discussed in turn below.
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Table 4 A comparison of the contracts for Bus, Rail, Ferry and proposed Metro in NSW (as of 2011)
Comparison
Description
No. of contracts
Term
Procurement process
Basis of contract

Contract originator
Contract

Asset ownership

Bus
15 metropolitan
7 years (2005-2011)
Negotiated
Service operating, vehicle
maintenance

Ferry

1
7 years? (2010-2016)
Negotiated
Service operating,
infrastructure and
rolling stock
maintenance
NSW government
RailCorp

NSW government
State Transit Authority and
private operators (eg Busways,
CDC, Forest, Area 4
Management Co)
Private and state-owned
State-owned

Performance Elements
Reliability (service critical
abatement)

Bonus/abatement provisions in
generic contract but not
currently implemented
Patronage payment
Generic contract provides for
bonus/abatement regime.
Varies by operator
Service quality payment
Provision made in contract but
not implemented
Incentive as % of contract value Not known
Asset maintenance
No
Reporting of operating
Not public
performance
Reporting of customer
satisfaction

Rail

Public

Metro (proposed)

1
7 years (2010-2016)
Negotiated
Service operating, vehicle
maintenance

1
35 years
Competitive tender
Design, Build, Operate, Maintain

NSW government
Sydney Ferries Corporation

NSW government
Private operator, probably a consortium
of private companies to provide
necessary skills

State-owned

Private with provision for transfer to
State ownership at end of contract

Unknown but unlikely Unknown but unlikely

Non-linear daily abatement regime
-100% to 0%

Unknown but unlikely Unknown but unlikely

0% to 4% (estimated)

Unknown but unlikely Unknown but unlikely

0% to 10% (estimated)

Not known
Unknown but unlikely
On-time running on
website (by line, by
week, by time period)
Annual Report
Public

Not known
Unknown but unlikely
Annual Report

-100% to +14% (estimated)
Yes
Not known

Public

Not known
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5.2.1 The nature of the contract
The Unsworth review (Unsworth 2004) recommended competitive tendering for the bus
contracts subsequently introduced in 2005. The government took the view that the public
interest would be better served by a negotiated contract process that took account of existing
operators in each area. Performance in these new contracts was proposed as a yardstick for
determining whether future contracts would be negotiated or put out for competitive tender.
Competitive tendering was similarly proposed for ferries (Walker 2007), but a market review
in advance of the contract preparation concluded that the private sector could not match the
existing public sector operator (SFC) on a combination of price and quality. This was subject
to debate in Parliament where the opposition (now the NSW government) identified their
intention would be to franchise ferry services (NSW Parliamentary Hansard, 22 June 2010).
On 11 May 2011, the new government announced that they were to start this process (NSW
DoT 2011). In the case of ferries there was also considerable public opposition to
‘privatisation’ especially a campaign built around Sydneysiders’ sentimental feelings towards
the long-standing harbour services (see for example www.saveoursydneyferries.org.au ). As
a special case, however, the NSW government did undertake a competitive tendering
process for the separate fast ferry service connecting Manly and Sydney CBD. In contrast,
the Sydney Metro contract was conceived to be a competitive tender process and there is no
evidence, even though the contract has not been implemented, that the NSW government
had intention to vary this aspect.
The current Rail Clearways infrastructure program is designed to give separate pathways for
freight and passengers and allow the sectoring of services. This would allow a future NSW
government to create separate infrastructure and operating contracts in the future as has
been common in European railways.
However, the focus of this paper is on the performance elements of the contracts. The
success of the performance incentive regimes depends on a number of factors and these are
discussed in the next sections.
5.2.2 Time and duration of contracts
The form of any contract has an effect on the approach towards performance. The designbuild-operate-maintain (DBOM) form of the Metro contract – possible because it was a
greenfield contract – meant that operating performance (reliability and quality) could be
influenced and potentially enhanced during the design and build stages before any services
were run. As the other three contracts are essentially operate-maintain or operate only in
form, their performance frameworks need to take into account legacy infrastructure and
vehicles which act as constraints to potential performance for example, through bottlenecks
and unreliable vehicles.
DBOM contracts by their nature need to take a longer term approach, not only to allow the
infrastructure to be built but to enable the supplier to recoup capital costs, through either the
fare box or government payments. This explains why the Metro contract was for 35 years,
compared with 7 years for bus, ferries and rail. But the length of contract does of course
have an impact on asset ownership issues. For Metro, ownership of the assets would be
vested in the NSW government and be used by the operator for the duration of the contract.
As state owned assets, the ownership of ferries, trains and the part of bus operations
provided by the State Transit Authority were in public ownership at the time of contract issue.
However, the asset ownership aspects of the bus contracts with private operators are not
clear: operators owned their own vehicles and bus depots at the start of the contract but
have received funding for new vehicles under the contracting regime. The long term status of
vehicles and depots and how these could/would be treated if contracts were to change hands
is the subject of ongoing discussion.
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5.2.3 Incentives
The size of the potential bonuses and abatements in relation to the overall value of the
contract will have an impact on an operator’s ability and willingness to fund quality services.
The survey of European urban transport contracts identifies a wide variation, from 0% up to
21% (European Commission 2008). The majority of contracts have provision for termination
and so in principal there is potential for 100% abatement. The European Commission study
found the maximum operator risk was 21% of operating payments if normal operations are
assumed. In comparison, the Metro contract proposed a situation where there was potential
for 100% abatement on any day with accompanying discussion estimating that potential
bonuses were of the order of 14% of the contract. The size of the incentive or abatement is
not clear in the other contracts, even where private bus operators are involved.
It must be understood that contracts need to recognise that the operator and contracting
authority will have different objectives. As the literature identifies, the private operator will be
driven by returns to their stakeholders, in particular profit-driven dividends to shareholders. In
the case of a public sector operator, the difference is more subtle but will still exist. A large
public sector operator may, for example, be as much interested in protecting its monopoly
position as if it was in the private sector and less interested in providing quality services for
customers. These asymmetries in expectations between parties require detailed contract
drafting. In particular there needs to be a clear understanding as to what is required at
signing and a detailed mechanism for reaching agreement for those issues to be agreed
post-signing. The Metro contract appears to be more precise in its specification of the detail
than the other modal contracts with little left to be agreed post-contract signing. In contrast,
the bus contracts left a good deal to be agreed later for performance related elements and
there is evidence that progress has been slow.
Successful contracting also depends on the degree to which the mechanisms in the contract
accurately reflect stakeholder expectations for passenger experience. Assuming that market
research has been successfully carried out, it is likely that an incentive regime based on
measures of outcome is more likely to match customer needs than one based on input
measures. Outcome measures also transfer more risk to the contract holder by recognising
that perceptions of the customer may be influenced by more than operational measurements.
Of the four modal contracts, it is clear that the Metro contract was the most precisely
specified in relation to performance and more related to output measures.
In addition, the KPIs used in the incentive regime must be carefully balanced to ensure that
the complex – and sometimes conflicting – needs of all stakeholders are met. Over the
period of the contract the operator will be incentivised to do anything possible (within the
spirit of the contract) to maximise its own objectives. This may be at variance to the needs of
other stakeholders. For example, if a contract were to focus on a single performance
measure such as on-time running, the operator has an incentive to amend the timetable in a
way that would ensure high scores on the measure. Moreover, 100% performance on this
measure would not necessarily lead to a positive passenger experience.
5.2.4 Risk
In a well defined contract, the incentive regime will be clear as to how the risk is allocated
between the contracting authority and operator. Performance attributes which attract bonus
or abatement payments provide the allocation of risk. The Metro contract put most of the risk
onto the operator: although there was a cap on quality bonus payments which limited the risk
of additional payments to the government, the abatement regime for the operator was total.
In the bus contracts, there is provision for the government and operator risks to be
symmetrical with regard to patronage growth, for a bonus only regime in relation to service
quality but with a cap on bonus and penalty payments for operational performance. As the
literature identifies, allocating risk between a government contracting authority and public

15

Australasian Transport Research Forum 2011 Proceedings
28 - 30 September 2011, Adelaide, Australia
Publication website: http://www.patrec.org/atrf.aspx
sector operator may not be appropriate, as the payment of bonuses and abatements could
result simply in transfer payments between the operator and government.

6. Conclusion
The discussion in this paper concentrates on the performance frameworks of the contracts
for four different modes in Sydney. It is acknowledged that these contracts will have some
mode specific and some location specific aspects. Nevertheless, there are some general
conclusions from comparing contracts within the same location which are not possible with a
comparison of same mode contracts between locations.
In NSW, where there have been independent inquiries prior to contracts being signed, these
have recommended competitively tendered contracts. However, for bus contracts there has
been no public explanation of why these recommendations were not implemented. In the
case of ferries, a market testing process fulfilled this role and led to the negotiation of
contracts with the incumbent, state owned operator. In contrast, the Metro contract was in the
process of being competitively tendered when the Metro was cancelled, suggesting the NSW
government was not averse to competitive tendering per se. It is an open question as to
whether negotiated contracts have provided as good an outcome for passengers in NSW as
compared to a competitively tendered alternative.
The contracting literature suggests that better contracts will have a close relationship
between the objectives of the contracting agency and the detailed workings of the
performance incentive mechanism. This requires a contracting environment where there is
trust and dialogue between the parties and this in turn depends on the nature of the contract.
More important perhaps is that contracts need to make responsibilities clear if integration and
co-ordination is to be successful. The experience of London Underground and Metronet
shows how quickly a breakdown of communication can lead to contract difficulties with
adverse outcomes for passengers (Transport for London 2008).
The chronology of the contracts for Sydney also reveals evidence of experience being
transferred between the different contracting exercises, with concepts in the bus contracts on
reliability, quality and patronage incentives also being part of the proposed Metro contract.
However, there are also significant differences: the performance framework proposed for
Metro is clearly specified and largely outcome based with better specified reporting
arrangements than any of the other contracts. Whilst this may have been driven by the need
to provide a contract that could withstand 35 years, it is clear that this clarity in contract
delivery for performance frameworks has not been integrated into contracts formulated post
Metro. In the run up to the renewal of the expiring bus contracts for metropolitan NSW, there
is a need to wait and see if the experience of clear and largely outcome-based performance
measures, as proposed in the Metro contract, will be integrated or ignored.
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